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Abstract
The Clarke Pivotal Voting Mechanism (CPVM) elicits truthful revelation of util-
ity functions by requiring any `pivotal’ voter to pay a monetary `Clarke tax’. This
neglects wealth eﬀects and gives disproportionate power to rich voters. We propose
to replace the `Clarke tax’ with a lottery, wherein the pivotal voter risks long-term
exclusion from the CPVM (and any other formal political participation). The re-
sulting voting mechanism is nonmanipulable, politically egalitarian, and implements
something close to Relative Utilitarianism.
Let A be a set of social alternatives and let I be a set of individuals. For all i ∈ I,
let ui : A−→R be a cardinal utility function describing i’s preferences over A. Classic
utilitarianism prescribes the policy alternative in A which maximizes the social welfare
function
P
i∈I ui. By using cardinal utility functions rather than mere preference order-
ings as input, utilitarianism escapes the pessimistic conclusion of Arrow’s Impossibility
Theorem. Furthermore, it admits several appealing mathematical characterizations, due
to Harsanyi (1953, 1955), d’Aspremont and Gevers (1977), Maskin (1978), Myerson (1981)
and Ng (1975, 1985, 2000). However, like almost any other voting system or social welfare
function, utilitarianism can be easily manipulated by voters who strategically misrepresent
their utility functions. The Clarke (1971) Pivotal Voting Mechanism (CPVM)1 is a `truth-
revealing’ implementation of utilitarianism, through a hybrid between a referendum and
an auction:
1. Each voter i declares a monetary valuation vi(a) for each alternative a ∈ A. We
regard vi(a) as a proxy for ui(a).
2. Given the set of valuations v := (vi)i∈I, society chooses the alternative α(v) ∈ A




1The CPVM is a special case of Groves’ (1973) demand-revealing mechanism. It was also promoted by
Tideman and Tullock (1976), and is extensively analyzed in the collection by Tideman (1977) and the
monograph by Green and Laﬀont (1979). See also §8.2 of Moulin (1988), §23.C of Mas-Colell et al. (1995),
§5 of Tideman (1997), and §8.1 of Mueller (2003).
13. If α(v) = a, then voter i is pivotal if there is some other b ∈ A with V (a) − V (b) <
vi(a)−vi(b); thus, if i had voted diﬀerently (i.e. if vi(b) had been bigger or vi(a) had
been smaller), then the social choice would have been b instead of a. In this case,




It is easy to check that τi(v) ≤ vi(a) − vi(b); in other words, the Clarke tax never
exceeds i’s personal gain in obtaining a rather than b. Thus i should always be willing to
pay the tax τi(v) in order to secure alternative a —assuming she expressed her preferences
honestly. Indeed, suppose i has a quasilinear utility function
ui(a,−ti) = wi(a) − ti, ∀a ∈ A and ti ∈ R, (1)
where wi : A−→R is her utility function over the policy alternatives and ti is the Clarke
tax she must pay (thus, we could say that wi(a) is the monetary worth which voter i assigns
to alternative a ∈ A). Consider a collection v−i := (vj ; j ∈ I \ {i}) of valuations by all
other voters. The valuation vi : A−→R is i’s best response to v−i if, for any other possible
valuation v0
i : A−→R, we have ui [α(vi,v−i);−τi(vi,v−i)] ≥ ui [α(v0
i,v−i);−τi(v0
i,v−i)]. We
say that valuation vi is a dominant strategy if it is a best response to every possible v−i.
Theorem 1 Suppose voter i has quasilinear utility function (1). Then i’s dominant strat-
egy is to set vi := wi + c, where c is any constant.2 2
If Theorem 1 holds for all i ∈ I, then in the resulting dominant strategy equilibrium, the
CPVM chooses the alternative which maximizes
P
i∈I wi. If τi(v) = 0 for all i ∈ I (which
will be true almost all the time, in large populations), then this outcome also maximizes P
i∈I ui; in this sense, the CPVM obtains the outcome prescribed by utilitarianism. The
CPVM also satisﬁes other appealing axiomatic characterizations, due to Moulin (1986)
and Sjostrom (1991). However, because it links voting to money, the CPVM has several
major problems:
(a) Real people’s utility functions are not `quasilinear’ as in eqn.(1). People are risk-
averse, so utility is concave as a function of money. If we modify eqn. (1) to reﬂect
this, then Theorem 1 is false (indeed, it is easy to construct nonpathological examples
where a risk-averse voter does not have any dominant strategy in the CPVM).
(b) The CPVM gives more voting power to those who value money less. For example:
• Suppose Ivan and John have identical utility functions (both being concave
functions of wealth), but Ivan is rich while John is poor. Then the CPVM gives
more voting power to Ivan than to John, because Ivan assigns less marginal
utility to each dollar than John.
2See Proposition 23.C.4 of Mas-Colell et al. (1995) or Lemma 8.1 of Moulin (1988).
2• Suppose Ivan and John have equal wealth, but John assigns higher marginal
utility to each dollar (e.g. John needs the money because he has expensive
tastes, costly medical problems, and/or several children to feed, whereas Ivan is
ascetic, healthy and childless. Then the CPVM again gives more voting power
to Ivan than to John.
Good (1977) suggested the CPVM address this problem by rescaling each person’s
valuation according to her marginal utility for money. However, it is impossible
to estimate these marginal utilities (and each person has considerable incentive to
exaggerate her own). Tideman (1997) proposed that Clarke taxes be paid in time
(spent, say, in community service) rather than money. However, Tideman’s method
is still inegalitarian: some people (e.g. retirees) have a lot of spare time, and hence
presumably assign it a low marginal utility, whereas others (e.g. working parents or
busy professionals) value their time very highly. Also, Good’s and Tideman’s variants
still implicitly assume that utility is a linear function of money (or time), which is
generally false.
(c) The quasilinear utility function (1) also assumes that person’s preferences over the
alternatives in A are totally separable from her wealth level. This is false. For
example, rich people and poor people have very diﬀerent preferences concerning
redistributive taxation schemes and publicly funded goods.
(d) Any revenue collected by the Clarke tax must be removed from the economy (e.g.
destroyed or donated to a faraway country), because otherwise voters who expect not
to pay a Clarke tax have an incentive to distort their valuations so as to inﬂate the
amount of revenue which is collected. Thus, the CPVM is never Pareto-eﬃcient.
Solution: If CPVM is to work (i.e. if Theorem 1 is to be applicable), then Clarke taxes
must be paid in some resource to which all voters assign linear utility. If the CPVM is to
be politically egalitarian, then this resource must be equally valuable to all voters.
Recall the von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) theory of cardinal utility functions. Let
B be some set of of alternatives, and deﬁne a lottery to be some probability distribution
over B. Assume that person i, when choosing amongst such lotteries, always makes choices
which satisfy certain minimal axioms of consistency and rationality. Then there exists a
utility function ui : B−→R such that i will always choose the lottery which maximizes
the expected value of ui; see (Myerson, 1991, Theorem 1.1) or (Mas-Colell et al., 1995,
Proposition 6.B.3).
By deﬁnition, the vNM utility of a lottery is a linear function of the probabilities of
the alternatives. Thus, we can satisfy the quasilinearity assumption of Theorem 1 if the
Clarke tax is paid by submitting to a lottery with some negative payoﬀ as a prize. To be
precise, suppose we require each voter to declare a valuation function vi : A−→[0,1]. It
follows that the Clarke tax ti := τi(v) will lie in the interval [0,1], so we can interpret it
as a probability. Let B = {b0,b1}, where b1 represents some `penalty’ and b0 represents
the status quo. Consider the lottery L which assigns probability ti to b1 and (1 − ti) to
3b0. Then it is clear that the utility of L (for voter i) is exactly −diti, where −di is the
disutility of the penalty b1 for voter i.
Suppose i’s joint vNM utility function ui : A × B−→R has the separable form
ui(a,b) =

wi(a) − di if b = b1;
wi(a) if b = b0.
Then i’s utility function over A and Clarke taxes has the desired `quasilinear’ form ui(a,ti) =
wi(a) − diti, so Theorem 1 holds: voter i’s dominant strategy is to declare the valuation
vi = wi/di + c, where c is any constant.
It remains to deﬁne the penalty b1. If the GCPM is be politically egalitarian, then the
disutility di of b1 must be roughly the same for every voter, relative to the intensity of
her political preferences. Clearly, a ﬁne paid in money or time is not appropriate, because
of problems (b), (c), and (d) above; the same objection applies to any other economic
penalty. Even a penalty such as death, torture, imprisonment, or exile could yield very
diﬀerent disutilities for diﬀerent voters (e.g. a suicidal or terminally ill person might not
fear death), in addition to being barbaric and politically unacceptable.
It is a notorious philosophical conundrum to determine whether a penalty has the `same’
disutility for two people; indeed, it is not clear that this notion is even meaningful; see
Sen (1970) or Roemer (1998) for discussions. Fortunately, we have a more modest goal:
a penalty which has the same disutility for each voter, `relative to the intensity of her
political preferences’. One penalty which presumably has this property is exclusion from
the political process itself. In other words, we propose that a pivotal voter who `loses’ the
lottery L must pay the penalty by forfeiting her right to participate in the political process
(e.g. vote) for some protracted period (e.g. N years, where N ≥ 5).
The disutility generated for voter i by this protracted exclusion must be comparable
in magnitude to the intensity of i’s preferences over the policy alternatives in A. In other
words, if −di is the disutility generated by an N year exclusion from the political process,






If not, then it is not possible for i to truthfully express her utility function using a valuation
vi : A−→[0,1] of the form vi = wi/di + c. If `political participation’ means `voting’, then
the magnitude of di reﬂects the utility of voting. But if the utility of voting is proportional
to the chance of changing the outcome, then it is utterly inﬁnitesimal in a large modern
democracy, as noted by Downs (1957). Indeed, being `pivotal’ is such an astronomically
improbable bonanza that it is easy to imagine a voter who would gladly forfeit her franchise
for the rest of her natural life, as payment for being pivotal in just one referendum. In this
case, the disutility of b1 is not large enough to make the CPVM work properly.
To escape this Downsian conclusion, we must enrich the deﬁnition of `political partic-
ipation’ to include other things besides voting in CPVM referenda. `Informal’ modes of
political participation include political speech and political association. However, we can-
not allow the penalty b1 to curtail such informal political participation for two (ironically
opposite) reasons: (1) Free speech and free association are fundamental human rights, and
4it is unacceptable for the state to curtail them. (2) The `Downsian voter’ would probably
assign political speech and association roughly the same utility as voting —i.e. almost
none —because she would judge that these political acts have virtually no inﬂuence on
public policy.
Instead, we must enrich the `formal’ aspect of political participation in some other way.
There are at least two promising possibilities:
• Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) have proposed another `point-based’ voting system
which truthfully reveals each voter’s preferences for budget allocations towards pre-
existing government programs; see §8.3, p.170 of Mueller (2003) or §4 of Tideman
(1997). Like the CPVM, the Hylland-Zeckhauser mechanism (HZM) makes it op-
timal for each voter to truthfully reveal her preferences, and thereby implements a
utilitarian outcome. Like our proposal (and unlike the CPVM), the HZM does not
involve real money, so it does not favour wealthy or ascetic voters.
• In addition to voting (in the CPVM or HZM), citizens can actively participate in pol-
icy creation and consensus formation through various forms of `deliberative democ-
racy’ (DD) which have recently been proposed; see Bohman and Rehg (1997), Elster
(1998), Fung (2003), or Fishkin and Laslett (2003).
In the HZM, every voter (not just the rare pivotal ones) exerts some inﬂuence (albeit
minute) over budgetary allocations. In deliberative democratic fora, citizens have a sense
of active engagement and empowerment within political institutions, rather than the alien-
ation and futility of the Downsian voter. Hence, participation in either HZM or DD may
confer much greater utility than mere voting; conversely, exclusion from both HZM and
DD may confer suﬃcient disutility to make the penalty b1 meaningful.
To translate Clarke taxes into probabilities, we have required each voter to declare
a valuation function vi : A−→[0,1]. If the utility of participation in the CPVM, HZM,
and/or DD is nontrivial, and the exclusion duration N is large enough, then the inequality
(2) will hold. In this case, vi will simply be the utility function ui rescaled to range over
[0,1]. Loosely speaking, in the resulting voting mechanism, each person’s worst possible
political outcome (not just in A, but over all political possibilities) is assigned a utility of
zero, and each person’s best possible political scenario obtains a utility of one. In other
words, this mechanism implements a variant of utilitarianism called Relative Utilitarianism;
see Cao (1982), Dhillon (1998), Karni (1998), Dhillon and Mertens (1999) and Segal (2000).
Conclusion: By replacing the monetary Clarke tax with a lottery, we have ensured the
quasilinearity assumption necessary for applicability of Theorem 1. In this lottery, the
pivotal voter risks long-term exclusion from formal political institutions, so the `Clarke
tax’ has roughly the same disutility for each voter, relative to the intensity of her political
preferences. This yields good approximation of Relative Utilitarianism. The resulting
voting system simple, practical, nonmanipulable, politically egalitarian, and immune to
Arrovian pathologies.
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